Speaking ofthese numerous international courts and tribunals, it should be emphasizcd that sorne of them, such as the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, have statutory provisions allowing for the submjssions of amicus atriae briefS. Others do not have such statutory provisions, a good exarnple being the International Court of Justice, wruch has been very reluctant so far to admit any amicus curiae. Then wc have the economic dispute settlemenr fora such as the Wro, the North American Free Trade Association (NAFrA) and the International Centre for Setdement of Investmenr Disputes. In this case, one can note that the WTO has been so tà.r very much the target of the submissions of amiats wriac briefS, but there is also an emerging practice with NAFTA Chapter Il procedures, and [ shall come back to that later on.
1 will focus my remarks on the WTO system, knowing that it is an inter-Scare system, which is also important, and that it has speciiic mies in temlS of dispute settlement procedures which are contained in the Understanding on Dispute Settlement (Dsu). When you look at the Dsu, however, you see that there is no speciflc provision on amicus wriae; the oruy thing which exists is that the panel can seek inforrpation. This is in Article 13 of the Dsu.
Then, for the WTO Appellate Body, there is nothing about ~",icus cun·ae. The only thing chat we have is that there are working procedures which can be elaborated by the Appellate Body. There is no specifie mention of amiws curiac but, in fact, there have been a lot of submissions of amicus curiae briefS, and they have bcen admitted within the realms of the WTO. This is intcresting because it has been a judge-driven process where the judge has accepted the submissions of amici cunae. Let us take the matter of accountability first. Very often when people arc discussing amicus curiae, what they are going te ask is: "Who are these people who are making submissions as amicus curiae? These people are not elected; they do not have any political mandate; but they think that they are able to enter into the realms of dispute settlement procedures and that they have a right to provide information." That is what we will caU the argument based on politicallegitimacy, and there might be a point about that.
However, there are other grounds for establishing legitimacy, such as expertise legitimacy. A matter which is important for us when we look at the case-Iaw of the WTO is that amid cunae have been brought in there very often to face siwations where there were disputes which were "cross-cutting" disputes-those involving trade and the environment or involving trade and other matters. In this context, the amicus Ctlriae was there to try to fill in the gaps. So there was an aspect of legitimacy: it was to represent the unrepresented at the WTO. That might be contested, of course.
Then another parameter is that when we speak about the environment we are speaking of global interests and global concerns, and States' territorial approach might not be the most adequate approach for representing the interests concerned in su ch global issues.
One other point also to be mentioned about the legitimacy aspect ofNGOS or other actors submitting amicus curiae briefs is that when you look at definitions of amicus curiac, for example in Black's Law Dictionary, you are going to sec that it is linked to publicinterest issues. So should the notion of amicus curiae at the WTO be linked to a publicinterest issue? When you look at the practice of the WTO, of the Appellate Body, in [act many of the amicus curiae briefs which have been accepted were not directly linked to public-interest matters as such, and that might be a question.
Then a last question is: should wc not be speaking of legal legitimacy? 1 ask that because when 100 king at other fora, you see that more and more amicus curiae briefs are admitted, so maybe there is an emergence of a customary international rule which allows for the submissions of amicus cunae briefS. For example, when you look at the Chapter 11 NAFTA context, you see that there have been two cases-the lWethanex case] and the UPS case 2 -where amiws cunae submissions have been accepted. And when you look at the reasoning of the Arbitration Tribunal in Methanex, it is quite interesting, because the Tribunal followed very carefitlly the reasoning of the Appellate Body in the WTO case. So is there an ernerging custornary rule?
Thesc are grounds for establishing legitimacy. l think that an important issue in this debate is the distinction that we should rnake betwcen public-interest actions through amiws am'ae and industry interests throughamieus curiae, and what is important with the WTO is that you do not have these clear-cut rules in tenus of distinguishing the intercsts which are represented there through amieus wriae briefs.
Nowa few remarks about the possible contribution of amicus wnae briefS, and l think these are linked to the discussion that we had yesterday about the efficiency of procedures. First, 1 think that amiws cunae briefs can bring a different, non-economic perspective, which might be importantJor resolving certain disputes. Then they bring additional speciflC information and expertise-factual as weIl as legal-and that is also something to be taken into consideration. They also allow for creative legal thinking, and very often the political positions are very constrained. So maybe atnici curiae can bring sorne more creative legal thinking into the debate. 1 aIso consider that amici wriae can, in fact, support the idea of competition ofideas. With amici am'ae t you are going to have other ideas which are going to be brought ta the forefront of the dispute settlement mechanism and, in fact, the Appellate Body has rnentioned the notion of the added value of amicus curiae briefs. Another issue which is interesting is that it is a low-cost strategy in terms of information gathering, and this might be also taken into consideration.
At the institutionallevel, what is also important is that atnici wnae might be viewed as a way to increase the legitimacy of the international mies in question. They are supported by different players; that means that they should find application or maybe that it would strengthen the argument in favour of their application. Then 1 think that there is a very important argument which is related ta the "international govemance" system of the WTO and ta the fàct that it is an inter-State system-a very closed inter-State system-and amieus cunae briefs are viewcd as a way for other actoIS to enter into the realms of the WTO. Now, is this a positive development? What is interesting is that when yod speak: with NGOs-and a representative of an NGo, the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), which has submitted amicus cunae briefs, is here \Vith us-not ail of them are in favour of submitting amicus curiae briefs at the WTO. 1 think that,one of their main concerns is the non-distinction which is made between them and the industry sector and the fact that they do not have the same tools for presenting or submitting amicus curiae briefs, so that there might be an issue of competition among non-State actoIS.
What is a150 true and what has ta be acknowledged within the WTO is that yOll . have a tension berween the political organ, the Council, the organ reprcscnting the States, and the judicial system_. and 50 far the political process has been very slow on th e matter of amicus a.riac. $0 haw can wc reconcile this discrepancy between the politicaJ organ's and thejudicial organ's views?
When you look ac che ease-law of the Appellate Body, they say Chat they have admittcd amiws curiae briefs, but in faet we do not really know what chey have done with them. 50 there is also an issue ofknowing \Vhar is going to be done with the content q.f amÎcus cudae briefs.
Anather intercsting point is chat sorne of the developing countries are very vocal ae the WTO against amiâ curiae. 1 rhink that there is a strong suspicion about Ncos being agents of the Northern countries and bringîng arguments on behalf of those counrries. Heoe is an issue of due process in relation to the equality of parties, and in 100 king ae this matter you might chÏnk thae admitting amialS wn'ae brieES is going ta go against the spirit of the negotiating roles in tenns of dispute setdement. This is a matter ta be taken in ta consideration.
Theo there is a matter of worlcload. Should am;OES Ctlriae briefS be admitted. rhat means chat the workload would increase. That might be true. but 1 do not think that it is onJy true for the developing couomes_ ft is true for everybody, but this concem could be resolved with proeess rules, whieh eould limit the number of pages and the foeus of the amicus cunae briefs.
Finally, sorne concluding rernarks about amicus cunae. There arc pros and cons about adm.itting amiws cunae briefs, but it seems to me, looking at the international practice, that things are going in the direction of admitting them, and what Îs now very mu ch at stake for aU tribunals and courts is to establish clear Mes on how to deal with them. It scems to me chat the rules that were established by the AppeUate Body in the Asbe5to5 case3 are not sufficient if we rcally waot ta be sure that there is going ta be a fair treatment of ail Parties and non-Parties within the judicial process.
A point that 1 would also like to highJight is that the discussion of amiws cunae should be linked to the issue of transparency in the eontext of the WTO. We aU know that the negotiation meetings are not public; they are confidential and aU the meetings \Vith respect to the dispute sett1ement procedure are non-public. With reference to the Freudian "myth of the dark room", one can associate such dispute settlement procedures with a "dark room", and the non-State actors are really wondering what is going on in it. It seems to me that if the room would be less dark maybe the NGOs and others would [eel less of an attraction for entering into it. So the issue of transparency may be a good argument to be looked at if you want ta regulate the issue of amiCf~S mnae. 
